Metro Vancouver Transit Discussion

[Meraki]

Originally Posted by Xerx

From the federal budget:

Any thoughts on what more private sector funding and financing mean in the context of Vancouver?

If they're going to force more P3 despite what would work best, it would mean a UBC extension of the M-Line would require a change of trains at VCC-Clark, or demolish VCC-Clark and start it from Commercial-Broadway.

The integrated system (Expo, Millennium, Evergreen) uses unionised labour (CUPE 7000) and it's associated OMC and infrastructure. If they're going to impose P3 as a condition of funding, we'll have Canada Line V2, with another unnessecary OMC and duplication of infrastructure.

If the CPC loses the election in October, we'll probably see some funding for it in a model with only minor handouts to SNC-Lavalin for construction, compared with the cash cow they were given in the P3 structure to both construct and operate.

[officedweller]

Evergreen Line IS a P3 - it just does not include the operation of the line.

However, without operation of the line, there's less opportunity for the private contractor to recoup any profits - so the financing from the P3 partner would likely be similar to Evergreen (carrying costs during construction), and not substantial like Canada Line ($700M).

[officedweller]

Evergreen Line IS a P3 - it just does not include the operation of the line.

However, without operation of the line, there's less opportunity for the private contractor to recoup any profits - so the financing from the P3 partner would likely be similar to Evergreen (carrying costs during construction), and not substantial like Canada Line ($700M).

5.3 Procurement Options Analyzed

5.3.1 Preliminary Procurement Assessment

Prior to completing a procurement options analysis,
the project team considered a number of options
to determine which traditional and partnership
models would form the basis for more extensive
quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The preliminary assessment of partnership options
concluded that:

• The use of a Design-Build-Finance-Operate-
Maintain (DBFOM) model (similar to the model
used for the Canada Line) was not deemed
appropriate for the Project. This reflects that the
Evergreen Line will be integrated into an existing
automated driverless system (the Canada Line
is a stand-alone system and is operated and
maintained separately). The Evergreen Line will
be operated seamlessly with the SkyTrain system.

• The use of a Design-Build-Finance-Maintain
(DBFM) model (similar to the model used on
the Docklands Light Rail system in the United
Kingdom, which also involves extensions to an
existing system) was also rejected. A DBFM
approach was expected to have higher annual
maintenance costs when compared to the
economies of scale that would be generated by
TransLink by maintaining the Evergreen Line as
part of the SkyTrain system (TransLink has one of
the lowest rapid transit operating costs around
the world, and has considerable experience and
expertise in operating and maintain SkyTrain,
relative to a new concessionaire).

The preliminary analysis did, however, suggest that
the partnership options offered benefits relating
to scope and schedule risk, and the project team
determined that a DBF model should be advanced
as the preferred partnership model for further study.

The project team undertook a similar preliminary
analysis to determine the preferred traditional
model to be used as a comparator to the PPP
model. Design Build (DB), Design Bid Build
(DBB) models, and a combination of DB and DBB
approaches (as was used on the Millennium Line)
were considered. The preliminary assessment of
traditional models concluded that:

• In the case of both the DBB and DB/DBB
combination approaches, these multiple contract
model approaches would not likely be the best
option to manage Evergreen Line risk in a public
procurement scenario. ALRT is a complex and
integrated system, with exceptionally stringent
technical requirements. The implementation
of multiple contracts brings risk at the interface
between contracts, and it is difficult to avoid at
least elements of this risk falling to the Province.

• Internal analysis and market sounding indicated
that project risk could be better managed under
a DB. In this scenario a single contractor or
consortium of contractors would have greater
flexibility in managing construction interfaces and
is required to assume the full risk for managing
those interfaces while delivering a fully functional
system, which provides the Province with greater
cost and schedule certainty than under a multiple
contract scenario.

Following this preliminary analysis, the DBF and
DB models were taken forward for more detailed
analysis.

5.3.2 Detailed Analysis

The detailed procurement analysis assumed the
following models:

Design Build (DB): Under a DB model, the Province
would engage engineers and architects to develop
a concept design for the project. The Province
would then conduct a competition to select a
design build team to undertake the detailed
design and construction of the Project, based
primarily upon the output specifications prepared
by the Province’s compliance team. The successful
team would enter into a fixed price contract with
payments being made by the government at
specific progress milestones.

In this model, design and construction risk is
transferred to the design builder, while the Province
retains life cycle maintenance risks. The DB contract
would include a general two-year warranty, with
five- or ten-year warranties for specific elements.
The benefits of a DB procurement model include
the enhanced risk transfer and innovation that
comes from integrated design and construction.

Design Build Finance (DBF): A DBF model
is similar to a DB option, with the addition of
private financing of a portion (or all) of the capital
requirements during construction. The private
finance is typically repaid on completion, with the
potential for partial hold back during an availability
demonstration period post substantial completion.
In addition the contract would include a two year
general warranty and five or 10 year warranties for
specific items.

The DBF option includes greater security around
the risk transfer related to cost and schedule,
in particular, through performance incentives
up to and including project commissioning as
a result of the at-risk private finance. Additional
benefits of this approach include: the addition of
lender due diligence; limiting scope change; and
enhanced enforceability. Satisfactory performance is
incentivized as the private partner would receive no
payment, or reduced payments as a result of work
that was incomplete or below a specified standard.

Both the DB and the DBF delivery models are
two-stage procurements, involving a Request for
Qualifications (RFQ) through which respondent
teams submit qualifications for evaluation.
Shortlisted teams are then invited to participate in
a Request for Proposals (RFP). Following the RFP
stage, the preferred proponent is eligible to enter
into a contract with the Province to design, build
and finance the Project.

5.4 Results of the Procurement Options Analysis

Based on the procurement options analyzed, the
DBF method was determined to be the preferred
procurement option, expected to best meet the
Province’s procurement objectives and overall
project objectives.

http://www.partnershipsbc.ca/files-4/project-elrt.php

[WarrenC12]

I appreciate the use of a "P3" model to mitigate schedule and financial risks, however without any numbers behind these options it's difficult to judge. Can we compare this to the M-Line extension and what happened with that initial schedule and budget? It didn't have a tunnel, but otherwise it's the closest thing I can think of.

[CanSpice]

Originally Posted by Meraki

If they're going to force more P3 despite what would work best, it would mean a UBC extension of the M-Line would require a change of trains at VCC-Clark, or demolish VCC-Clark and start it from Commercial-Broadway.

The integrated system (Expo, Millennium, Evergreen) uses unionised labour (CUPE 7000) and it's associated OMC and infrastructure. If they're going to impose P3 as a condition of funding, we'll have Canada Line V2, with another unnessecary OMC and duplication of infrastructure.

If the CPC loses the election in October, we'll probably see some funding for it in a model with only minor handouts to SNC-Lavalin for construction, compared with the cash cow they were given in the P3 structure to both construct and operate.

Is there anything stopping UBC from being the 'private' partner in P3 for a Broadway extension?

[SOSS]

This is a map of all the P3 projects on the go. The only component of the Evergreen Line that is P3 is Lincoln Station.

http://www.p3canada.ca/en/about-p3s/project-map/

[queetz@home]

Originally Posted by CanSpice

Is there anything stopping UBC from being the 'private' partner in P3 for a Broadway extension?

Greed on the university's part, thinking it is entitled to billions more of tax dollars worth of exceedingly expensive infrastructure to enhance their already excellent transit service, to be paid by everyone else from the region, province, and country while having no desire to pay their fair share.

[Zassk]

Originally Posted by queetz@home

Greed on the university's part, thinking it is entitled to billions more of tax dollars worth of exceedingly expensive infrastructure to enhance their already excellent transit service, to be paid by everyone else from the region, province, and country while having no desire to pay their fair share.

Not sure why the eye-rolling attitude. Whether we build UBC's transportation infrastructure with (more) tax money, sell/develop some of its endowment assets, find alternative funding sources etc. - whatever mechanism we use to pay for its infrastructure, it all effectively comes from the same public pot of gold.

[st7860]

Originally Posted by CanSpice

Is there anything stopping UBC from being the 'private' partner in P3 for a Broadway extension?

Not sure about that but I don't know anything about greed. LOL. The Route 99 is the busiest bus route in North America. I wouldn't call that 'good service'. Just 'busy service'. UBC is a big employment center and deserves more.

[GlassCity]

Yeah this logic of punishing busy, overcrowded service because it's already frequent doesn't really make sense to me. Though I do think they should help out with an extension, especially if it means we don't have to stupidly phase such a short corridor. Maybe it could pay for the portion going from a Sasamat Street Station to campus. It could even go elevated in the median of University Boulevard to save money. They're building a lot of stuff right now on campus: a new Student Union Building, a new aquatic centre and many other projects. A SkyTrain extension would definitely be the most beneficial out of all of these.

[WarrenC12]

Originally Posted by Zassk

Not sure why the eye-rolling attitude. Whether we build UBC's transportation infrastructure with (more) tax money, sell/develop some of its endowment assets, find alternative funding sources etc. - whatever mechanism we use to pay for its infrastructure, it all effectively comes from the same public pot of gold.

He hates everything to do with Vancouver. That should explain it.

[officedweller]

Originally Posted by SOSS

This is a map of all the P3 projects on the go. The only component of the Evergreen Line that is P3 is Lincoln Station.

http://www.p3canada.ca/en/about-p3s/project-map/

Those are only the projects funded by the PPP Canada Fund.

The $417 M the Feds are funding Evergreen Line with must come from a different fund.

The Evergreen Line is a P3 under the auspices of Partnerships BC, not PPP Canada.

Here are the P3 projects un Partnerships BC:

http://www.partnershipsbc.ca/projects/

[SOSS]

Originally Posted by officedweller

Those are only the projects funded by the PPP Canada Fund.

The $417 M the Feds are funding Evergreen Line with must come from a different fund.

The Evergreen Line is a P3 under the auspices of Partnerships BC, not PPP Canada.

Here are the P3 projects un Partnerships BC:

http://www.partnershipsbc.ca/projects/

Thanks for clearing that up!

[queetz@home]

Originally Posted by Zassk

Not sure why the eye-rolling attitude. Whether we build UBC's transportation infrastructure with (more) tax money, sell/develop some of its endowment assets, find alternative funding sources etc. - whatever mechanism we use to pay for its infrastructure, it all effectively comes from the same public pot of gold.

That's actually not true on UBC's part. Like YVR, UBC has access to funds outside the taxpayers of the region, province and country.

They already make a killing by allocating a certain number of residency to train Persian Gulf medical students for a hefty fee, in which they would later return to Saudi Arabia.

SOCSMA, whose members include doctors working at UBC, maintains that selling residencies to non-British Columbians is wasting capacity and not addressing the urgent needs of BC patients who can’t access family doctors and specialists in a timely fashion.

“UBC, which is a taxpayer-funded institution, seems to have its priorities turned upside down in pursuit of this offshore revenue. At a time when British Columbians are facing doctor shortages in virtually every community across the province … the province should not be turning away highly skilled BC students who want to come home, start families and become hardworking taxpaying members of their communities,” Thompson said.

Canadian medical students who pay taxes here (note these training programs are funded by OUR government) need those residency training too, right? And Canadians need doctors too, right?

So why not UBC give back something to the community, aka funding for a UBC Line, after taking away so much?

[st7860]

The UBC line will benefit the city with less congestion.

[SFUVancouver]

Originally Posted by queetz@home

Greed on the university's part, thinking it is entitled to billions more of tax dollars worth of exceedingly expensive infrastructure to enhance their already excellent transit service, to be paid by everyone else from the region, province, and country while having no desire to pay their fair share.

Or, the university takes seriously its role as an educational institution and not a transportation funding partner. Comparisons of UBC and YVR are off-base; one has a mandate to educate while the other has a mandate for transportation. If the university is not forthcoming with promises of capital contributions to a line that is not yet even officially proposed, I will err on the side of assuming the university knows where its statutory authority ends and not 'greed'.

Originally Posted by queetz@home

So why not UBC give back something to the community, aka funding for a UBC Line, after taking away so much?

Taking away so much? Your comments are just baffling sometimes.

[aberdeen5698]

Originally Posted by CanSpice

Is there anything stopping UBC from being the 'private' partner in P3 for a Broadway extension?

How about the fact that their core competencies have pretty much nothing to do with designing and building transportation projects?

I'm not saying that they can't contribute, but I think that contribution should be in terms of funding, not management of the project.

[Kisai]

Originally Posted by SFUVancouver

Or, the university takes seriously its role as an educational institution and not a transportation funding partner. Comparisons of UBC and YVR are off-base; one has a mandate to educate while the other has a mandate for transportation. If the university is not forthcoming with promises of capital contributions to a line that is not yet even officially proposed, I will err on the side of assuming the university knows where its statutory authority ends and not 'greed'.



Taking away so much? Your comments are just baffling sometimes.

The one thing that Vancouver has done backwards from Toronto is what was connected by rapid transit. The University of Toronto is literately right in the middle of the Subway system... but point of note... it's also right downtown. However you can't get to the Airport at all using the Subway in Toronto, and that's a major downside for both tourism and education. In Vancouver you can't get to the Universities by Rapid Transit, but you can get from the Airport to the Train station, something you can't do in Toronto. Likewise you can't get to the Airport in Montreal from the University by Subway either.

Vancouver's two major Universities UBC and SFU are not connected by Rapid Transit (and I'm not going to call Surrey Central SFU as part of it, because the University moved resources TO Surrey, not the other way around.) UBC has the B-line which is as close to BRT as it's going to get without the Subway being extended in full. SFU already had the proposed Gondola project nixed by the Mayor of Burnaby, so we're probably never going to see it short of him and his wife retiring from politics.

That said... I'm not sure if the Gondola project is the right option right now. Wait to see how traffic adjusts after the Evergreen line opens and use that to consider more options. Most options are unsuitable for climbing grades, and those that are, either have environmental impacts or safety concerns that can't be resolved.

[SOSS]

I look forward to a couple years worth of big-data collected from Compass. That should provide some additional insight on actual travel patterns. The data collected is going to substantially improve (or disprove) existing business cases for expansion. It will also be a fundamental component of any future business case studies.

[WarrenC12]

Originally Posted by queetz@home

They already make a killing by allocating a certain number of residency to train Persian Gulf medical students for a hefty fee, in which they would later return to Saudi Arabia

I am fairly certain UBC's Med School has requirements to spend it's revenue within the school itself or associated medical programs in the community.

I know for a fact portions of that money have been spent on programs at VGH that benefit not just educating doctors, but also medical procedures for the general public.