Quote:
Originally Posted by J.OT13
When was that dark decade? It seems like Vancouver is the only city that has been continuously been expanding it's network over the last 35 years, with Calgary coming in second.
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I would say that progress was made,
despite the Provincial government's interference.
A very not-so-quick history lesson: Translink was created by the Province in 1999 to download and delegate regional transportation planning, funding, procurement, and operation from the provincial level (BC Transit) to the local/regional level in Metro Vancouver. Central to this grand bargain, which included uploading some responsibilities from the region to province, shifting debt, etc., was a promise of additional funding tools to enable Translink to fulfill its mandate and obligations. The additional funding mechanism was originally going to be a car registration tax but this was withdrawn at the last moment by the (outgoing) NDP government and the (incoming) Liberal government promised in its campaigning to provide an alternate and better permanent long-term funding tool. This never happened.
In 2005, in the midst of years of back and forth wrangling about the promised funding tools between the Translink Board and the provincial government, the Canada Line was put forward by the Province as a fait acompli for the next rapid transit line, skipping over the planned Evergreen Line. The Translink Board voted it down twice before approving it, mostly to demonstrate that it was an independent body and the Province was dealing with it in bad faith.
Furthermore, the Province issued the RFP for the Canada Line and it called for undersized capacity for such an important trunk line and specifically excluded economies of scale and efficiencies that would be realized from integration with the existing system from the evaluation of bidders. This resulted in the SNC-Lavalin-based team winning with a bid that introduced new trains that were physically incompatible with the existing system (width, platform height, train control system, etc.) and required a whole new operations and maintenance and train storage yard and permanently prevents interoperability between the Canada Line and the rest of the SkyTrain system. This was a colossally shortsighted move, the negative impacts of which will be felt in perpetuity.
Now, the Canada Line, setting aside the trainset decisions, was still the right line to build since it was integral to the Olympics in 2010. But the back and forth and multiple Translink Board votes infuriated the Provincial government and in 2007 the Province imposed legislation arbitrarily restructuring Translink. It removed the non-partisan airport and port authority-style Translink Board of experts that had been running Translink for almost a decade and replaced it with a Mayors Council and a Provincially-appointed Executive Board. The Provincial Government would define the transit plan for Translink and the Mayors Council would be responsible for approving the plan and figuring out the funding. If they disagreed with the Province's plan or voted down anything, the Provincially-appointed Executive Board was empowered to proceed anyway.
The only way that Translink could raise the ongoing revenue required to operate and maintain the regional transit system and the regional major road network, including major new Provincially-mandated capital projects like the over-built/money-losing Golden Ears toll bridge and the successful but expensive Canada Line, all while providing population growth-driven increases in bus service, was to significantly increase transit fares, the regional Translink gas tax, parking tax, and Hydro levy. These increases were supremely unpopular in Metro Vancouver after years of Provincial transit funding promises, and the timing of them being phased in as the 2008 Great Recession loomed only added insult to injury.
This hopelessly politicized system led to round after round of fighting between the Mayors Council and the Provincial Government. The Province put forward a fantastically ambitious 2008 Provincial Transit Plan for Translink and campaigned on it in that year's election (arguably earning reelection in large part from Metro Vancouver ridings swayed by its scope and promised major funding increases). However, once re-elected, the Province left it up to the Mayors Council to figure out how to fund the new SkyTrain lines, bus service, and new bridges, and every one of the Mayors Council funding proposals was rejected by the Provincial Government.
Meanwhile, the Province approved the Evergreen Line but refused to provide Translink with new tools to fund its share of the line’s capital cost and its operation, let alone the investment in new bus service that would be required for the suburban Tri-City area to access and utilize the new line. An agreement was eventually struck in which the Mayors Council agreed to temporarily increase the gas tax to pay for its share of the Evergreen Line upfront capital costs, with the explicit promise from the Province that it would provide Translink with replacement long-term funding for the line’s operation and associated bus service by the time the temporary gas tax increase expired. The Province reneged on this promise as soon as the gas tax went up.
Fast forward a few more fractious years and in 2015 the Province announced that it would be prepared to increase the PST in Metro Vancouver by 0.5% (that worked out to about 25 cents a day per household) in order to fund its 2008 Provincial Transit Plan promises, but before it would do so, it would require a successful result from a new transit funding referendum and all future funding increases for Translink would also be required to be passed by referendum. This new wholly unprecedented policy was announced during a time when the Province was making billions upon billions of investments in the region's highway infrastructure without any requirement for local capital funding participation or approval by referendum.
After being starved of funds since day one and forced to impose unpopular fare increases and gas and parking taxes to help fulfill the unfunded budget shortfalls associated with operating the new SkyTrain lines, Translink was ridiculed in the press by the Province and anti-transit polemicists as being wasteful, incompetent, and unable to fulfill the Province's unfunded 2008 Provincial Transit Plan. Deferred maintenance, aging equipment, and calamitous weather caused several never-seen-before delays and full system shutdowns of the SkyTrain system and the lack of spare buses and the lingering effects of budget-driven driver hiring freezes meant that Translink could do little to help the hundreds of thousands of people regularly struggling to get through their commutes. And all of this occurred during the run-up to the referendum. Unsurprisingly, it failed.
Fortunately, the situation has dramatically changed. The new Provincial Government eliminated the Translink Executive Board and fully empowered the Mayors Council. The Mayors laid out their three-phase 10 Year Plan, which is almost identical to the 2008 Provincial Transit Plan, just a decade later, and between the Province, Federal Government, and an empowered Translink, funding has been secured for the first two phases.
That gets us to where we are today, with long, long overdue investments being made in bus service, new SeaBuses, SkyTrain station renovations and expansion, new SkyTrain cars, and the first phase of the Millennium Line extension to UBC and the Surrey-Langley rapid transit system approved, funded, and moving forward. Shovels should be in the ground for the Millennium Line expansion by 2020, the year when the original 2008 Provincial Transit Plan promised the full line to UBC would be operational.
The recent investments have resulted in ridership surging like a coiled spring and for the last several years Translink has experienced some of the largest ridership growth in North America:
2014->15
364.3M boardings
+2.0% (averaging 20,274 additional daily boardings)
2015->16
386.2M boardings
+6.0% (averaging 60,000 additional daily boardings) |
234.2M journeys
(Compass begins tracking journeys; 1st tap to last, regardless of transfers, is 1 journey)
2016->17
408.2M boardings
+5.7% (averaging 60,274 additional daily boardings) |
247.8M journeys
+5.8% (averaging 37,260 additional daily journeys)
2017->18
437.4M boardings
+7.2% (averaging 80,000 additional daily boardings) |
262.6M journeys
+6.0% (averaging 40,548 additional daily journeys)