Gee I'm shocked. :D

Here are YOW's sad October pax stats:

Sector / Oct-19 / Oct-20 / % Chg.
Dom: 351,500 / 38,551 / -89.0%
TB: 49,252 / 0 / -100.0%
Int'l: 19,811 / 0 / -100.0%
TTL: 420,563 / 38,551 / -90.8%

Sector YTD 2019 / YTD 2020 / % Change
Dom: 3,369,688 / 955,631 / -71.6%
TB: 580,139 / 163,093 / -71.9%
Int'l: 356,656 / 168,382 / -52.8%
TTL: 4,306,483 / 1,287,106 / -70.1%

12 Months Rolling / % Change vs Year End 2019
Dom: 1,579,496 / -60.5%
TB: 269,251 / -62.6%
Int'l: 238,363 / -38.5%
TTL: 2,087,110 / -59.16%

The only meaningful stat these days:
Month-Over-Month Change
Sector / Sep-20 / Oct-20 / % Change
Dom: 44,068 / 38,551 / -12.5%
TB: 0 / 0 / #DIV/0!
Int'l: 0 / 0 / #DIV/0!
TTL: 44,068 / 38,551 / -12.5%

I'm not comfortable with this development. My understanding is that there is a fundamental design flaw with the aircraft - the centre of gravity of the 737 moved as a result of the Max 8 redesign (engine weight and location), resulting in the plane's tendency for the nose to pitch upward. They installed MCAS to compensate for this - a compromise software solution to avoid a redesign of the air frame. This is one of the risks of constantly modifying a plane that first flew in 1967 - not only is it technically risky, but it also allowed Boeing to avoid having to certify a brand new aircraft.

Not a centre of gravity issue, but rather the new position of the bigger engines is forward and higher, causing the cowlings to rise slightly above the top of the wing...generating unnecessary lift. The original 737 design is very low to the ground with short landing gear. The new, more fuel efficient engines are much bigger and thus, they had to modify the engine supports to allow for ground clearance. MCAS was designed to counter the nose up tendency by pushing it down. As you say, a software solution/compromise was a risky venture and criminal not to train or tell pilots about it. In my mind, MCAS is only necessary if you don't tell the pilots about the nose up condition.

It remains to be seen if the public agrees that the MAX is fixed.

The general public will probably forget about it a few months after its back in the air. They can't even tell the difference between a 737 NG and a MAX anyways.

The main group travellers that know aircraft types are the frequent flyer status biz travellers group...who aren’t doing much travelling these days.

Yeah but this isn't how planes work. Every flight requires a proper weight and balance to be performed. There are quite rigid safety tolerances that need to be met to be within the operating envelope of the aircraft, so no improperly balanced aircraft can legally take off. As for the airframe redesign thing, this is nothing new. Virtually every aircraft type in the commercial world has multiple generations and variants and newer/bigger engine options (mostly to do with the bypass ratio for turbofan engines), and yes many with slightly different aerodynamic properties. This is not the real issue. It isn't so much that there is a 'flaw' with the airframe itself, rather than Boeing was trying to meet an unrealistic goal.

When they were shopping the MAX around, airlines wanted a type commonality and no need to retrain pilots for the airframe, which is the problem. Since the MAX has slightly different handling characteristics than its predecessors due to the stretch in the fuselage and the new engines (which you allude to as being a risk in your post), but this is nothing new either. Usually this is cured by updating systems etc. to meet the requirements of the new airframe. Normally this comes with extensive pilot retraining and normally requires a specific type certification for the pilots flying. Boeing instead - in order to meet airline demands - decided to install the MCAS system you spoke of and then not tell anyone about it, which was an egregious move. Unfortunately lots of people died. This speaks less to the actual safety of the airframe and more to the ethical culture of Boeing.

So long as Boeing institutes the ADs as suggested by the FAA, there shouldn't be an issue, especially since the level of scrutiny of the aircraft has been rather meticulous over the last two years or so. The decision of the Minister to have higher standards here is puzzling. If the standards of the FAA aren't good enough for us, I'm not sure what would constitute a satisfactory review.

Anyway the TL;DR version: the problem had much more to do with lack of training that would have been mandatory if Boeing had followed the rules, than an 'aging airframe'.

^ Well said optimusREIM.

However, let me add something to one of your sentences.

Let's be clear. The FAA has been allowing Boeing to practically certify their own aircraft for years. FAA oversight has been extremely poor in the certification process of the MAX, so both Boeing and the FAA are to blame for the crashes.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/house-comm...ry?id=73035288

Transport Canada has always been a more conservative agency than the FAA. Several examples of this can be seen throughout the years.

The Initial FAA flight standardization board report for the B787 had the 787/777 on a common type rating. TC was never on board with this, and both airframes were on different type ratings from the get go. Of course now, after several reviews, even the FAA has backed off from their initial assessment, and the wording on subsequent reports has been toned down to "the B-787 and the B-777 are separate type ratings that have been determined to have commonality".

So it should be no surprise that TC is doing their due diligence on the MAX as well, and the outcome will be more strict here than in the US. Like I said, this has always been the case. As much as I despise Transport Canada with regards to certain things, when it comes to indigenous aircraft certification, they are on point. Crashes like the ones involving the MAX won't happen to aircraft built here in Canada, simply because the TC oversight is much better here than in the US. I have several contacts at Bombardier, including one which was directly involved in the aircraft certification of the CSeries a few years ago. Let's just say that BBD had to jump through a lot of hoops to meet TC requirements. Which is a good thing. And frankly, BBD had planned for that.

The only reason why the MAX was certified by TC is because of their bilateral agreement with the FAA, which has since, essentially, been thrown out the window, so to speak. Expect tighter reviews by TC for any airframe coming out of the US in the subsequent years.

Ehhhh

Doesn't work like that. We didn't throw out the bilateral recognition of type certification. Our aerospace sector would suffer if we did that. And as much as people want to slam the FAA, there's quite a few of us who recognize that we might well have made the same mistake (I'm involved in some aircraft cert on the military side). There's lessons to be learned by all here. And we're all trying to incorporate those lessons into our own processes going forward. There's an active debate in all the airworthiness communities on how far should derivatives be allowed with the original Basis of Certification. It's not just the MAX. I've got military aircraft that we're working mods on that were originally certified in the 70s.

The specific issue on the MAX is also more than just the aerodynamics. There's the issue of not requiring more than two Angle of Attack sensors. And how those sensors were piped into the Flight Control System (without cross-referencing or multiple voting). There's the whole concept of resolving the adverse aerodynamic forces by moving the trim tabs instead of say a stick pusher inside the cockpit. And the lack of a fully digital fly by wire system with envelope protections. MCAS was just one hole in the swiss cheese model.

http://westjet.mediaroom.com/2020-11...-Hawaii-travel

WS to offer an approved pre-flight test for travel to Hawaii.

All of this is only sort of true.

Yes, there's a bilateral.
Yes, TC approved the MAX in no small part due to the bilateral.
No, the bilateral hasn't been thrown out in any way, shape, or form.
Tighter reviews going forward? Depends.

When a foreign entity applies for Canadian approval of its product, where there exists a bilateral covering part that product, TC receives one or several technical briefings on the product and then must submit a "validation" (as opposed to certification) work plan covering areas of interest for further exploration.

The work plan must be solidly defensible and founded on principles such as differences in regulation, new or novel design feature(s), unique or challenging or controversial means or methods of compliance, etc.

Any whiff of excessive scope, or deviation to/"abuse" of the implementation procedures for airworthiness (IPAs or TIPs, google it see example below) will be pushed back on hard by the foreign applicant and its agency. Heck, even perfectly normal and defensible reviews are routinely fought.

So tighter reviews going forward "because MAX" or because we don't trust them won't fly without substantive changes to the TIPs/IPAs. There is and will always have to be solid reason for proving deeper into anything beyond the tech. briefing(s).

And it goes both ways in protection of our industry.

Edit: here are the IPAs between Canada and USA.

https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation/air...-united-states

See section 3.4 "Validation Principles" for what I'm talking about.

Update:

AC as well.

https://aircanada.mediaroom.com/2020...oing-to-Hawaii

Where are the testing sites? I assume these are Dynalife labs and will cost $150. Air Canada’s testing sites are apparently going to be specific pharmacy partners (and the cost?).

Dynalife appears to exist in Alberta. I think the equivalent in BC is Lifelabs.

I was in my local Lifelabs about two weeks ago and they said they had signs by the entrance saying they do not do COVID. In BC COVID is generally done very specialized temporary facilities. Maybe they are going to set something up at the airport?

The pharmacies will probably be announced in the coming days. I imagine the costs will be roughly the same.

WestJet & Delta have withdrew their joint venture application citing the conditions imposed were not justified.

https://www.regulations.gov/document...2018-0154-0056

So, the JV isn't going through??

^ Pretty much. A bit surprising, really.

The problem seems to be the 16 slots at LGA they needed to divest.

For consumers, this is a win. The more competition, the better. For both airlines, this was a complete waste of time, it seems.

Interesting read, or should i say, rant. The words arbitrary and capricious keep coming up.

https://www.regulations.gov/document...2018-0154-0056

I see. That's very surprising, to say the least. So pretty much all the noise of the past couple of years was for nothing. I guess the LGA slots were that important to them.

What they basically keep saying in the response is the restrictions are inconsistent with past approvals. They were expecting there to be no conditions.

The question is what changed. Perhaps the change is the Trump people or their policies. Withdraw now means they could try again in 6 months and potentially get very different results.